Sava – altered course and submerged facts: The myth about the lack of crisis communication during the great Zagreb flood of 1964 circulating for six decades

Abstract

Extended summary: 

The flood caused by the overflowing of the Sava River on the night from 25 to 26 October 1964 is considered by most expert sources and in various scientific fields, areas and branches to be the largest recorded natural disaster to hit Zagreb. A total of 17 lives lost were recorded, while 40000 people were left homeless, and a third of the city area at the time was flooded. The damage was wide-spread, of material nature and one that cannot be measured in terms of the economy, which is why the great affliction quickly became a major disaster. 

Documentary accounts of this crisis situation continue to emphasize, among other, that the water level of the Sava River had been rising since the morning hours, that no alarm had been sounded, and paradoxically, the Croatian Radio and Television, in its own productions, has repeatedly emphasized over the decades that “the news was announced too late on the radio and television”, conveying the impression that “...no one had cared enough to prevent the disaster.” (Croatian Radio and Television, 2014). 

In contrast, a facsimile of the Radio Zagreb news broadcast live on 25 October 1964 at 1:30 p.m. shows that this medium publicly announced that Zagreb was in danger, comparing the current circumstances with the flood of 1933 and the possibility of similar or more severe consequences. Furthermore, information was simultaneously transmitted about an emergency meeting of the then City Flood Defence Headquarters, which was held in the morning hours, and the expected evacuation of the population from the areas at risk of flooding if the water level did not decrease, was also unequivocally announced. The emergency broadcasting of Radio Zagreb began precisely with these announcements, which completely adapted its programme to the current situation in a manner that “warned of the gravity of the situation”. Radio Sljeme also joined the public crisis communication, with announcements at 4:30 p.m., and an analysis of the recordings from that time shows that the radio programme, which at that time lasted between noon and 5 p.m. daily, was not interrupted for the first time and was broadcast for 72 hours continuously on the frequencies of as many as three stations. These efforts were made to ensure the greatest possible reach of the information broadcast on the radio, because for most people in the areas affected by the flood, the radio was the “only connection to the world” (Kreutz, 1964). Speed, accessibility and the lowest technical requirements compared to other channels for transmitting information are the main characteristics of this medium (Sapunar, 2000), which is why radio waves remain to this day the primary model of individual and mass communication in emergency situations despite the development of modern technologies and communication platforms. 

However, sound that is aired, if additional technologies and devices are not used, will not be saved and is therefore not suitable as a primary source of data for subsequent reconstructions and chronological reviews of phenomena and events. Up until the period of informatization and digitalization, social events, especially those of historical significance, were recorded due to printing techniques in which numerous, more or less important narratives were preserved, which have been interpreted and transmitted differently over time. 

Owing to the consequences of the disaster, i.e. the damage that had occurred, and technical reasons, on the day of the 1964 flood, for the first time in the history of the city since the beginning of newspaper printing in Zagreb, no newspapers were published (“The Vjesnik newspaper building suffers extensive damage”, 1964), so numerous activities of key stakeholders and relevant city services from the period immediately before the culmination of the crisis remained unknown to the general public. The claim that over time, even the greatest disasters with catastrophic consequences can be displaced from collective memory if they were not previously adequately recorded, is certainly supported by the facts surrounding the torrential flood caused by the Medveščak stream in 1651, when three times more lives were lost compared to the flood of the Sava River in 1964! Namely, on the day of the tragedy on 26 July, as many as 52 people, in a city with significantly fewer inhabitants than in 1964, lost their lives, and a significant part of the inhabited and uninhabited area was devastated (Fagač, 2018). At that time, there were no newspaper publications to directly record the event; the first newspaper in Zagreb was printed 184 years later and has been published in the Croatian language since 1835 (Narodne novine (Official Gazette), 2025). 

An analysis of newspaper and electronic media publications and original documents related to the Sava River flood indicates a gap in the objective transmission of the event. Television, as expected, transmits the most powerful depictions of tragedies and the scale of disasters using images, which is its comparative advantage. Radio serves the function of quickly transmitting information, instructions and, in this specific case, two-way exchange of messages during a crisis situation. Newspapers are mainly focused on topics related to the recovery from the consequences of a crisis, and integrate a descriptive, educational and broader informative component, including political communication and even commercial advertising. Considering the social order of the time and the high political positions of the key and responsible individuals from that period, it was expected that public media communication would focus on disaster recovery activities and mitigating the consequences of the crisis. The journalistic engagement did not go unnoticed, but after the flood, there was no detailed account, nor was pre-crisis communication thoroughly analysed. In the “Poplava” (The Flood) documentary film by director and screenwriter Bogdan Žižić, filmed the same year, the time and events that preceded the disaster were not mentioned once in its 25-minute duration. From the newspaper archives, an announcement from 4 November 1964 stands out, in which, although under a title that considers the flood to be a series of tragic circumstances, there is an interview with experts from the Hydrological Department of the Hydrometeorological Institute, who revealed that the Institute had warned of the danger and the need for extraordinary defence against a possible flood on 15 October, i.e. ten days before the crisis (Večernji list, 1964). Did just one day without newspaper articles contribute to the absence of relevant facts and the occurrence of later misinterpretations and incorrect conclusions about the measures taken, or the communication and operational processes implemented before and during the crisis event, as well as potential manipulations in public discourse, for which responsibility was shifted from crisis management and governance to crisis communication processes?

1 RESEARCH SUBJECT AND METHODS

This paper explores the employment of communication practices immediately before and during the Great Zagreb Flood of 1964, the role of the media in that crisis situation, and the influence of press releases on the transmission of that event throughout history. The aim of the paper is to identify the communication activities that resulted in the mobilization of individuals and groups, and the practical actions of emergency services, to detect the level of organisation of the activities that were carried out, and to link them with the actions of the relevant services. A special research interest is focused on the concept of institutional memory, the creation of a public narrative based on permanently accessible records, and the use of acquired experience for the purpose of strengthening the crisis standard. 

In accordance with the above, the following hypotheses were set:

H1: Despite common claims, the population of Zagreb was warned about the danger of the 1964 flood through the media.

H2: The lack of preserved media releases led to inaccurate historical representations of the event. 

H3: The experience of the 1964 crisis greatly influenced the development of safety standards and flood protection systems.

During the research, several scientific and research methods were used, as well as various data sources, including primary ones. The descriptive method was utilised to describe relevant facts and observed processes, while the content analysis method was used to collect data from a range of relevant materials. The comparative method was utilised to compare related facts and information bearing similarities. Given the importance of historical sources, the historical research method and the case study methodology were also applied. The inductive method was utilised to reach conclusions about general judgements, and the deductive method was utilised to draw individual conclusions in the paper. 

The results of this research can serve as guidelines for improving the practice of crisis communication, regulating media standards for reporting during threats, and formalizing procedures in the concept of modern crisis management and communication.

2 PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

Despite the lack of documentary and archival information about crisis communication immediately before and during the Great Zagreb Flood of 1964, which was significantly affected by the interruption in the printing of daily newspapers, an in-depth analysis of media information content and relevant materials undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that, despite numerous technical obstacles, and owing primarily to radio communication, a fair level of public information about the crisis was achieved and, as much as possible, an even larger disaster was prevented. It has been confirmed that, despite earlier differing assumptions, the public had been warned of the possible danger. It has also been indisputably confirmed that public communication led to the mobilisation of individuals and legal entities, ensured communication continuity as a prerequisite for organising operational activities and, to a significant extent, rescued and guided citizens during the crisis. Based on the evidence collected, it can be concluded that crisis communication has been held responsible for the insufficient level of crisis management, but the strategic activities that followed the disaster had a significant impact on raising the safety standard in the area of ​​flood defence of the Croatian capital, as well as the adoption of more specific protocols and the formal organisation of the entire field of expertise.